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WHAT HAPPENED IN IOWA? 
David E. Pozen* 
Reply to:  Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial 
Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 
Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 27 (2011). 
 
November 2, 2010 is the latest milestone in the evolution of state judicial 
elections from sleepy, sterile affairs into meaningful political contests.  
Following an aggressive ouster campaign, voters in Iowa removd three 
supreme court justices, including the chief justice, who had joined an opinion 
finding a right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution.1  Supporters 
of the campaign rallied around the mantra, “It’s we the people, not we the 
courts.”2  Voter turnout surged to unprecedented levels;3 the national media 
riveted attention on the event.  No sitting Iowa justice had ever lost a retention 
election before.4 
Although unusually dramatic, this episode is continuous with hat has 
transpired in other recent high court races.  In fact, it bears striking parallels to 
the 1986 California Supreme Court race that helped launch the modrn era of 
judicial elections.  Then as now, a well-financed attack on one set of liberal 
 
 * Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State.  Thanks to William Baude, 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz, Charles Geyh, Alon Harel, Jeremy Kessler, Jason Mazzone, 
Kristin Olson, Adam Shinar, and Robert Wiygul for helpful comments.  The views expressed 
herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State 
or the United States Government. 
 1. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 2. A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges over Marriage Issue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
3, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (quoting signs at election night party); see also id. (quoting statement by 
leader of ouster campaign that result “will send a message across the country that the power 
resides with the people”). 
 3. See Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges:  Landmark Iowa Elections Send Tremor 
Through the Judicial Retention System, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 56, 57 (reporting turnout rose 
more than twenty percentage points above typical rates); Jason Clayworth, Midterm Vote Saw 
Record Turnout, Des Moines Reg., Nov. 30, 2010, at B1 (reporting elections drew “the largest 
midterm . . . turnout in Iowa history”). 
 4. A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges over Decisions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 
2010, at A1.  
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decisions (overturning death sentences) led retention election voters t  unseat 
three justices, including the chief justice, for the first time in the state’s 
history.5 
I.  THE IOWA ELECTIONS AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The Iowa results, which came in after my article Judicial Elections as 
Popular Constitutionalism went to press, would seem to confirm the article’s 
claim that “judicial elections have the capacity to serve . . . as highly 
consequential vehicles of popular constitutionalism.”6  The ouster vote 
represented a symbolic affirmation of popular sovereignty,7 generated public 
accountability,8 and fostered extensive legal dialogue.9  Through the election 
mechanism, ordinary citizens joined together to engage a contested 
constitutional question and to assert their primacy over judges in the 
elaboration of constitutional meaning—“we the people, not we the courts.”  
Whether Iowans learned anything in the process about themselves or their 
constitution,10 and whether their intervention will ultimately lead to a change 
in the governing law, remains to be seen. 
Regardless of one’s views on how judges ought to be selected or how 
constitutional controversies ought to be resolved, it remains possible to decry 
the outcome in Iowa.  November 2 was a bitter day for those who saw the state 
supreme court’s ruling as a triumph for civil rights and progressive 
constitutional change.  But it is important to appreciate that the fact that three 
justices got thrown out for the way they decided a value-laden case is not, in 
itself, evidence of an institutional breakdown.  It is evidence of a healthy 
electoral system.11  Crudely put, if you are appalled by the manner in which 
Iowans registered their dissent, then you are appalled by the logic of judicial 
elections, and you probably don’t much like popular constitutionalism either. 
In their engaging response to my article, Nicole Mansker and Neal Devins 
question whether judicial elections really do, and ever can, facilitate popular 
 
 5. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 287 & n.99 
(2008) [hereinafter Pozen, Irony of Elections].  Importantly, though, whereas the California 
justices were accused of consciously and chronically disregarding state law, no such charge was 
leveled against their Midwestern counterparts. 
 6. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 
2047, 2052 (2010) [hereinafter Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism]; see also id. at 2053–64 
(explaining theory of popular constitutionalism). 
 7. See id. at 2068–70 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to serve as “critical 
moments for expressing the people’s active, ongoing sovereignty” (quoting Larry D. Kramer, The 
People Themselves:  Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 197 (2004) [hereinafter 
Kramer, The People Themselves])). 
 8. See id. at 2070–71 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to serve as “accountability 
mechanisms”). 
 9. See id. at 2073–74 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to stimulate constitutional 
dialogue). 
 10. See id. at 2074–76 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to serve as “teaching 
moments”). 
 11. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 5, at 296–300, 310–13.  Healthy, that is, 
according to basic precepts of electoral theory.  I do not mean to claim that the Iowa system is, all 
things considered, a good system, or that it worked in the way its framers intended. 
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constitutionalism.12  “The root problem,” they argue, is lack of “voter interest 
in [and knowledge about] either the state or federal constitutions”;13 on 
account of these deficits, judicial elections will seldom achieve significant 
levels of constitutional dialogue and will instead tend to center on 
nonconstitutional issues.  In these arguments, Mansker and Devins build on 
their valuable previous work on the ways in which state courts respond to 
public opinion14 and on the difficulties posed by low-information voters.15  
Professor Devins is a leading proponent of the view that state courts have the 
ability to incorporate popular sentiment into their decisionmaking coherently 
and efficaciously, and a leading critic of the view that popular 
constitutionalism, in the form envisioned by scholars such as Larry Kramer 
and Mark Tushnet, is either viable or desirable. 
These arguments largely complement my own.  Although I do not believe 
that current levels of public ignorance and apathy are quite as ruinous as 
Mansker and Devins suggest, I agree that they pose a major impediment to any 
plan to realize popular constitutionalism.16  Mansker and Devins’s admonition 
that constitutional issues often have low salience in judicial races echoes part 
of my overinclusiveness critique.17  Their suggestion that elected judges may 
debilitate civic debate and ossify legal doctrine by hiding from contentious 
issues aligns with my discussion of the dynamics of backlash.18  Both of our 
pieces take pains to emphasize that “the different natures of state and f deral 
constitutions must be acknowledged in any state-focused theory of popular 
constitutionalism,”19 and that “other state features outside of judicial 
elections,” such as initiatives and referenda, appear “better suited to a vance 
the popular constitutionalists’ goals.”20  And we are joined in our concern that, 
to an undue degree, “what competitive judicial elections do is politicize the 
court[s].”21 
Yet seemingly unlike Mansker and Devins, I would not write off judicial 
 
 12. Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular 
Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 27 (2011), 
http://columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/111 27_Mansker.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 37. 
 14. See generally Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into 
Account:  Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 
1629 (2010); Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 455 (2010). 
 15. See generally Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution More 
Democratic?, 55 Drake L. Rev. 971 (2007); Neal Devins, The D’oh! of Popular 
Constitutionalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1333 (2007) (reviewing Jeffrey Rosen, The Most 
Democratic Branch:  How the Courts Serve America (2006)) [hereinafter Devins, Popular 
Constitutionalism]. 
 16. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2093–99. 
 17. See id. at 2104–08. 
 18. See id. at 2128–33. 
 19. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 31; see Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra 
note 6, at 2088–93. 
 20. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 37; see Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra 
note 6, at 2088–93, 2110–12, 2119–23. 
 21. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 36. 
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elections as potential outlets for popular constitutionalism.22  Indeed, it is that 
very same politicization of the courts that underlines the possibility.  The 
observation that many of these elections have “focus[ed] on single issues,”23 
such as the constitutional status of same-sex marriage, is not an indictment of 
their capacity to play this cultural and functional role, butrather a testament 
thereto. 
My article explored a variety of reasons why judicial elections are li ble 
to be compromised (as well as unattractive) vehicles of popular 
constitutionalism.  The article also explained, though, how under the right 
conditions they may be able to get the job done.  While advocates of “popular 
constitutionalism” have not defined the concept with precision, it would take a 
stringent and particular understanding for the Iowa elections—with their 
record-breaking turnout, historic removal votes, and intense public agitation 
over a burning equal protection question—to be left out.  No one ever said 
popular constitutionalism would be pretty. 
II.  CROSS-BORDER (AND INTERNAL) COMPLICATIONS 
Except when one looks closely, the example of Iowa turns out to be a 
little more complicated, for a reason that Mansker and Devins identify in 
passing:  “[O]n constitutionally salient issues like same-sex marriage, out-of-
state interest groups often play a defining role in financing negative advertising 
and otherwise seek to shape judicial elections.”24  We now know that out-of-
 
 22. It appears we may also part company on the question whether contested elections are 
liable to undermine the legitimacy of state supreme courts—or at least, on how best to frame this 
inquiry.  Following political scientist James Gibson, Mansker and Devins suggest that “judicial 
elections might legitimate state supreme court decisionmaking” by attracting the support of 
voters.  Id. at 32 n.23.  This sociological understanding of legitimacy looks to the beliefs that 
members of the public hold, and scholars like Gibson use polls and surveys to test it.  See, e.g., 
James L. Gibson et al., The Effects of Judicial Camp ign Activity on the Legitimacy of Courts:  
A Survey-Based Experiment, 64 Pol. Res. Q. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review).  In my own scholarship, I have been more interest d in testing the work of the courts 
against normative conceptions of legitimacy that do not directly depend on public opinion, which 
has long favored judicial elections at the state level, reflects widespread ignorance about what 
judges do, is heavily susceptible to priming effects, and may have a built-in majoritarian bias. 
 23. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 36.  The observation that judicial elections have 
also focused on “irrelevant personal characteristics,” id., is, however, a large problem for any 
popular constitutionalist account or defense thereof.  See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra 
note 6, at 2104–08, 2111. 
 24.  Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 35–36.  Onemight also question whether the 
Iowa process was sufficiently focused, deliberative, and informed; perhaps many voters registered 
their views on same-sex marriage generally rather tan on the justices’ ruling per se.  In his 
excellent overview of the elections, Todd Pettys contends that “[w]hat makes the Iowa experience 
so problematic is that, no matter what one’s political preferences might be on the issue of same-
sex marriage, one who reads the [Iowa Supreme Court’s] Varnum opinion will find that the 
court’s reasoning fell well within the parameters of established methods of constitutional 
analysis.”  Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa:  Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three 
Justices, 59 Kan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); see also id. (manuscript at 15) (emphasizing “visceral punch” of anti-retention 
advertisements, as compared to “more substantive and high-minded”—and therefore less 
effective—messages of pro-retention groups); Tyler Buller, Note, Framing the Debate:  
Understanding Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Retention Election Through a Content Analysis of Letters to 
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state groups spent more money on the Iowa elections than did in-state 
groups.25  A similar financial dynamic characterized California’s Propositin 8 
campaign,26 which overturned the state supreme court and deconstitutionalized 
the right to same-sex marriage.  These outcomes highlight a number of 
challenging normative questions for popular constitutionalism, including the 
classic concerns over whether it is sufficiently rational and rights-protective.  
The role of out-of-state influences raises a more basic, definitional question, 
about the contours of the community of persons meant to parici te in popular 
constitutional lawmaking.27  The notion that the people themselves ought to 
determine their own constitutional fate certainly sounds stirring.  But who are 
“the people”? 
The literature’s answer has been straightforward—popular 
constitutionalism is meant to empower “ordinary citizens” in the 
administration of fundamental law.28  In its standard formulation, the theory 
pits alienated common folks against aloof federal judges.  The latt r have 
steadily arrogated to themselves all the interpretive power, even though in our 
democratic scheme the former were meant to rule; it is the great burden of 
modern constitutionalism to overthrow judicial supremacy and rectify this 
historic inversion.  The first wave of popular constitutionalism’s critics 
featured several scholars, Professor Devins among them, who questioned 
whether ordinary citizens have the capacity or the will to take the Constitution 
away from the courts.29  (Others questioned whether “we the people” and “we 
 
the Editor, 97 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 23) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (finding “[t]he second most common frame used by anti-retention advocates,” in 
letters published by newspapers, “was that V rnum was wrongly decided for religious or moral 
reasons”). 
 25. The vast majority of out-of-state spending went to the anti-retention side.  See Roy A. 
Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election:  Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 
Ct. Rev. 68, 70–71 (2011) (reporting three out-of-state organizations together spent over 
$900,000 against justices, whereas “[t]he main in-state sum spent against [them] was $10,178”); 
Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice et al., 2010 Judicial Elections Increase Pressure on Courts, 
Reform Groups Say 3–4 (Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Iowa Press Release], at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/release-november%202010-110310-final.pdf 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting out-of-state organizations accounted for 
roughly $700,000 of $800,000 spent to defeat justice , versus roughly $400,000 spent by in-state 
organizations in support of justices).  
 26. See Dan Morain, Proposition Funds Flow from out f State, L.A. Times, Aug. 1, 
2008, at A3 (stating “[a]t least 39% of the $3.3 million supporting Proposition 8’s proposed ban 
on same-sex marriage has come from outside California,” while “[o]pponents have drawn 52% of 
their $5.7 million from outside the state”); John Wildermuth, Prop. 8 Among Costliest Measures 
in History, S.F. Chron., Feb. 3, 2009, at B1 (“Millions of dollars in out-of-state money flowed 
into both campaigns . . . .”).  Much of the analysis in this essay would also apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to California’s Proposition 8 struggle. 
 27. The role of out-of-state influences, in other words, takes us all the way back to “step 
zero” of political theory, to the identification ofthe polis. 
 28. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 7, at248; see also Larry D. Kramer, 
Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 959 passim (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, 
Popular Constitutionalism] (repeatedly identifying “ordinary citizens,” along with  political 
officials, as subjects of popular constitutionalism). 
 29. See generally Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days:  Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, 
and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 Geo. L.J. 897 (2005); Devins, Popular 
Constitutionalism, supra note 15. 
2011 WHAT HAPPENED IN IOWA? 95 
the courts” ought to be seen in such oppositional terms.30)  Focused on the 
national level, these scholars expressed skepticism that a sufficiently large, 
representative, and informed swath of Americans could be counted o  to fulfill 
the active, lawmaking role that the theory would assign to them.  The 
deliberative and participatory preconditions of popular constitutionalism might 
only rarely be attainable. 
When we shift our focus down to the states, however, the incompleteness 
of this debate quickly becomes apparent.  We observe that the United States 
contains not one but a multiplicity of constitutional orders, formally 
independent from yet deeply interconnected with each other, as well as a 
multiplicity of populist legal devices such as initiatives, refe enda, recalls, 
legislative overrides, attorney general elections,31 and judicial elections.  The 
institutional architecture of popular constitutionalism is far more elaborate, 
visible, and robust at the subnational level; scrutiny of the states helps expose 
just how underspecified the standard theory is.  This is not to say that popular 
constitutionalists ought to have accorded state constitutional systems equal 
stature or significance as the federal system.  Yet given their positive aim of 
exploring how ordinary citizens experience and contribute to constitutional 
interpretation, their normative aim of reclaiming “diffuseness and 
decentralization” in the construction of legal norms,32 and the critical 
importance of state courts and constitutions in the life of the country, it seems 
likely that many would find state constitutionalism highly relevant to their 
project.33  Of particular interest here, the Iowa elections demonstrate how the 
permeability of state boundaries puts pressure on the assumption of a unitary 
“people” aspiring to self-rule. 
Popular constitutionalism, in short, has a federalism problem.  My article 
focused on judicial elections, but the problem is more general:  St te-state and 
state-national tensions could arise from all manner of popular constitutional 
activities.  The balance of this essay will explore one facet, by showing how 
the role played by out-of-state interests in Iowa invites us to think critically 
about the notion of popular sovereignty that underlies the literature. 
A.  Confusion 
When they unseated three justices on account of the same-sex marriage 
 
 30. See generally Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich. L. 
Rev. 2596 (2003) (questioning empirical basis of claim that strong forms of judicial review 
undermine democracy); Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1361 (2005) 
(questioning theoretical basis of this claim). 
 31. See Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122 
Harv. L. Rev. F. 108, 111–15 (2011) (suggesting state attorneys general ought to play larger role 
in accounts of popular constitutionalism). 
 32. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 28, at 963. 
 33. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2066–68, 2108–10 (explaining 
“why popular constitutionalists have ample reason t care about state courts and constitutions, 
independent of their federal analogues”); cf. Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in 
‘Dialogue’:  A View from American States 5–15 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing debate over “ontological status” of state constitutions—
whether they deserve to be considered “genuine” sources of higher law—and documenting their 
practical and sociological importance). 
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ruling, were Iowans truly exercising their own collective authori y to control 
the courts and determine constitutional meaning?  Or did the role of external 
money and advocacy dilute or distort the popular basis of the act?  Of course, 
only Iowa residents were allowed to cast a ballot.  But to some degree their 
votes, and their decisions whether or not to vote, were influe ced by out-of-
state sources.  Those influences might call into question the aunticity of the 
revolt, the sense in which Iowans authored the achievement. 
This point should not be confused with the stronger claim that genuine 
popular constitutionalism requires exclusively or predominantly grassroots 
action—mobbing, perhaps.  Any such standard would be unrealistic in modern 
society.  A certain amount of dedication, deliberation, and agreement ay be 
all we can reasonably ask for in a constitutional politics.  Yet even if some 
might see spending by corporations and special interests to jeopardize the 
purity, integrity, and organicity of ballot outcomes generally, in light of the 
realities of the political marketplace and the limits of civic competence, one 
need not necessarily go that far to appreciate the distinctive concerns raised by 
cross-border expenditures.34 
When money pours into a state, it can help amplify debate and invigorate 
the efforts of local actors, and thereby augment popular forces that were 
already stirring.  The interactions between internal and external social 
movements may be mutually reinforcing rather than unidirectional.  This was 
evident in Iowa, as local norm entrepreneurs coordinated with out-of-state 
allies to form and operate ad hoc campaign organizations, particul rly on the 
pro-incumbent side.35  Yet this dynamic can also attenuate the relationship 
between that state’s citizens and the constitutional ends they pursue.  The 
salience of one or both sides’ positions, if not also the substance, may to some 
extent be manufactured by individuals and entities who are not part of the 
relevant decisionmaking community.  (Assuming, that is, that popular 
constitutionalism prioritizes the will of a bounded community over, say, a 
universal communicative rationality.  Let us provisionally adopt this 
assumption, which is consistent with the literature’s emphasis on “ordinary 
citizens” and the “will of the people.”36)  Empirically, moreover, the extent to 
which outside groups have been affecting local policy processes, whether to 
distort or enrich them, will often be very difficult to tell. 
A hypothetical involving non-U.S. outsiders may help sharpen the point.  
If, in support of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s candidacy for president, a 
grassroots movement swept the nation and ushered in an amendment repealing 
 
 34. These concerns may be especially acute when the und rlying issue is, as in Iowa, one 
of state law.  It is easier to appreciate why all Americans might have an interest in supervising the 
state courts’ administration of federal constitutional guarantees. 
 35. See Pettys, supra note 24 (manuscript at 9–15) (detailing these interactions); cf. David 
E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 283, 294–314 (2008) 
(explaining concepts of social, policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurship). 
 36. Let us also bracket the various objections thatmight be raised to the notion of a 
“popular will” on questions of constitutional meaning.  See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, 
supra note 6, at 2120–22, 2132.  I am grateful to Robert Wiygul for incisive comments on this 
subject. 
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the United States Constitution’s Natural Born Citizen Clause,37 most observers 
would, I assume, have little trouble identifying this phenomenon as popular 
constitutionalism.  Should we feel any differently if it turns out that Austrian 
supporters of Schwarzenegger conceived, spearheaded, and/or bankrolled the 
movement?38 
B.  Competition, Conflict, and Conformity 
The Iowa elections stimulated a kind of mass constitutional competition, 
over whether to support or oppose same-sex marriage and judicial recognition 
of new constitutional rights, that has in recent years been all but absent at the 
national level.  Ordinary citizens literally rallied to the cause of their 
constitutional beliefs.  With competition, however, comes division.  Candidate 
elections not only galvanize social forces but also sharpen and dichotomize 
them.  They render constitutional argument as political theater, a pitched battle, 
with the judicial aspirants as the personification of one side’ hopes, 
grievances, and worldview.  Lacking the elaborate procedural rules and 
professional norms of litigation, the structured reasoning a d justification of 
judicial opinions, or the multistage, supermajority hurdles imposed by most 
constitutions’ formal amendment processes,39 the constitutional competition 
waged through judicial elections tends to be comparatively thin, shrill, and 
abrupt.40  Negative advertisements pumped in from out of state only 
exacerbate the divisiveness of the drama.  We might generalize this 
(concededly unsubstantiated) claim:  Relatively undisciplined, unmediated, 
majoritarian acts of constitutional decisionmaking—truly populist forms of 
popular constitutionalism—are as liable to fracture as to unite a p ople. 
Judicial elections can also breed second-order competitive effects.  To the 
extent that local mechanisms of popular constitutionalism allow states to 
develop distinct constitutional cultures, norms, and policies, they may help 
 
 37. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (limiting presidential eligibility to “natural born 
Citizen[s]”). 
 38. Or does this analogy falter because the Austrians, s foreigners, would have limited 
affective ties to and knowledge of this country, and therefore suspect motives?  Or because they 
have no basis to participate in the United States constitutional amendment process, whereas U.S. 
citizens from one state do have an entitlement to participate, indirectly, in the constitutional 
amendment processes of other states (at least for issues such as marriage that implicate norms of 
comity and recognition)?  To reject the analogy on this latter ground, one would presumably have 
to reject the notion that the U.S. states are fully sovereign entities with respect to their own 
constitutions. 
 39. It is notable in this regard that the Iowa Constitution is substantially more difficult to 
revise than most other state constitutions.  See Pettys, supra note 24 (manuscript at 7, 18–19, 25–
26) (explaining Iowa amendment process and positing “[t]here might be an inverse relationship 
between the ease with which activists can place a proposed constitutional amendment before the 
voters and the likelihood that justices will be targeted for non-retention”). 
 40. Compared to the constitutional competition elicited by presidential elections and 
federal judicial appointment fights, on the other hand, the Iowa experience does not look so 
anomalous.  All departmentalist models of popular constitutionalism ultimately rely on selection 
mechanisms to determine who will be authorized to speak for the people on constitutional 
matters; it is unsurprising that those mechanisms would become sites of political struggle.  See 
Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2063–64 (discussing relationship between 
departmentalism and popular constitutionalism). 
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capture some of the benefits we associate with decentralization, “provid[ing] 
an additional and more accessible platform for collective deliberation,” 
“facilitat[ing] exit and voice in constitutional lawmaking,” “hold[ing] up a 
mirror to the national model.”41  By empowering voters to fashion their courts, 
elections can, at least in theory, contribute to a more vibrant system of 
constitutional federalism.  This is not necessarily a good thing.  When it comes 
to matters of fundamental rights and constitutional affilition, values such as 
local particularism and experimentalism take on a decidedly ambiguous cast.  
For this reason, among others, a number of scholars have criticized ambitious 
schemes of state constitutionalism as threats to the larger projct of American 
constitutionalism.42 
The role of out-of-state influences creates a more basic complication.  By 
injecting themselves into the Iowa elections, national groups like the Family 
Research Council43 have done more than skew these contests and put pressure 
on the remaining justices to reverse course and deconstitutionalize s me-sex 
marriage.  They have also sent a warning to elected judges across the country 
that their seats may be targeted, too.  The most profound impact of the ouster 
campaign likely lies not in its visible effects within Iowa but in its invisible 
chilling effects on courts beyond.  The campaign was conservative in its 
resistance to judicial creativity and legal change as well as in its sub tantive 
content.  Its goal was to homogenize U.S. constitutional practice by bringing 
an outlier state back into line with the prevailing sociolegal norm and, in so 
doing, to reinforce that norm.  The net result of the Iowa elections, then, may 
well be a national constitutional landscape that is less dynamic and diverse, in 
that the United States will have fewer jurisdictions that grant same-sex 
marriage rights, and fewer judges in the other jurisdictions who are willing to 
stick out their necks on this issue or related issues.  In a federated polity, 
certain types of constitutional competition within states can depress 
constitutional competition among states. 
There is another, more concrete sense in which the competitive pressures 
of judicial elections may bear on the question of who constitutes “the people” 
in popular constitutionalism.  In resolving disputes thatcut across jurisdictional 
lines, elected judges have a strong incentive, if not also a political mandate, to 
privilege their own constituents’ interests above the interests of outsiders.  This 
hometown bias is one of the best-known criticisms of elected judges.  What is 
less appreciated is that the same set of incentives can affect purely domestic 
disputes, when the “outsiders” are noncitizen residents who lack the franchise 
or minority groups who are widely despised in the broader population.  
Irrespective of the legal merits, recognizing new rights for a class of illegal 
aliens—or, in certain states, of gay plaintiffs—is not a good career move for 
the elected judge. 
 
 41. Id. at 2109. 
 42. See id. (discussing “theorists of state constitutionalism [who] have argued that the 
development of a vigorous, self-conscious model threatens to subvert the operations of federal 
constitutionalism”). 
 43. See Iowa Press Release, supra note 25, at 3 (identifying National Organization for 
Marriage, American Families Association, Family Research Council, Campaign for Working 
Families, and Citizens United as major funders of Iowa ouster campaign).  
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“The people” and “the citizenry” are frequently conflated in the popular 
constitutionalism literature.  Yet if “the people” encompasses all persons who 
live within a sovereign territory, these two groups are not coextensive.  While 
this conflation may in some cases be the product of loose language rather than 
deliberate choice, it smuggles in a controversial judgment on citizenship as a 
prerequisite to the right to participate in consideration of constitutional 
questions.  Whether or not one agrees with this judgment matters  great deal 
to the question of how to realize popular constitutionalism in practice.  
Institutional mechanisms such as judicial elections that tend to empower 
“ordinary citizens” in the administration of constitutional lw may tend to 
disempower noncitizens.  Within as well as across communities, we must come 
to terms with who is and who is not a proper subject of p pular 
constitutionalism. 
C.  Conversation and Commotion 
Thus far, we have been focusing on some of the less appealing 
implications of the insight that the Iowa elections were not entirely a local 
event.  But let’s not forget that the activists from other states who devoted their 
time and resources to the Iowa campaign were themselves engaging in a kind 
of popular constitutionalism.  For those who feel passionately that same-sex 
marriage deserves no constitutional protection, the campaign provided a forum 
for testing this position and a focal point for enhancing public awareness and 
mobilizing public support.  Through their advocacy in Iowa, these activists 
sparked a national conversation about same-sex marriage rights and he role of 
the courts—a conversation that could affect the trajectory of constitutional law 
in this area for years to come.  Iowa’s unique role in the U.S. presidential 
selection system further magnifies the significance of the results.  Several 
potential Republican presidential candidates for 2012 promptly celebrated the 
ouster vote as a model of democratic action; Newt Gingrich expressly 
connected the vote to popular constitutionalist (and Tea Party) themes, 
heralding the “citizen revolt” now underway against “dictatorial” judges.44 
Hence, while the cross-border aspects of the Iowa elections may have 
weakened their claim to being a pure instance of constitutional self-
determination, those same aspects also made the elections more relevant on a 
broader stage.  This sort of interstate spillover, this blurring of the local and the 
national, reflects a larger trend in American electoral politics.  As judicial 
elections have increasingly drawn the attention of major media outlets and 
advocacy groups, and as congressional elections have increasingly become 
referenda on national issues,45 these races have become increasingly important 
 
 44. See Pettys, supra note 24 (manuscript at 19–20) (describing reactions of Mike 
Huckabee and Newt Gingrich and quoting Gingrich); Catalina Camia, Bachmann Praises Ouster 
of Iowa Judges in Gay Marriage Ruling, USA Today, Mar. 24, 2011, at 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/po t/2011/03/michele-bachmann-judges-
iowa-gay-marriage-/1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing remarks of Michele 
Bachmann); Iowa Press (Iowa Public Television broadcast Feb. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.iptv.org/iowapress/episode.cfm/3825 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(interviewing Rick Santorum about his views on, and role in, ouster campaign). 
 45. Cf. Rick Pildes, Political Polarization and the Nationalization of Congressional 
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contributors to the national discourse of popular constitutionalism. 
Robert Post and Reva Siegel astutely observed in 2007 that “state court 
opinions about state law are venues within which national values ar  
continually contested and reshaped.”46  State court elections can be even more 
vibrant venues in this respect.  Their publicity, accessibility, and winner-takes-
all format give them significant power to catalyze and crystallize constitutional 
argument. 
* * * 
So, the relationship between popular constitutionalism, federalism, and 
judicial elections turns out to be quite complicated, conceptually as well as 
empirically.  A full treatment would require a major undertaking, a book.  
Here, I hope simply to have shown that popular constitutionalism is not only 
more legible at the state level but also more institutionally and intellectually 
complex, more promising but also more problematic. 
III.  POLITICAL JUDGES, BOUGHT JUDGES, AND JUDICIAL ELECTION 
REFORM 
A final note on a subject that Mansker and Devins raise in closing.47  If 
one is distressed by the recent events in Iowa and by the political turn in 
judicial elections more generally, what can be done? 
It is helpful, in thinking about reform possibilities, to disentangle two 
criticisms of judicial elections.  The first criticism is tha  elections generate 
judges who are more likely to conform their outputs to constituent preferences.  
The second criticism is that elections generate judges who are more likely to 
rule in ways that gratify their campaign supporters, as an incentive or reward 
for such support.  Although frequently conflated, these two types of deviations 
from the ideal of the wholly law-bound jurist are fundamentally different.  The 
former reflects a defensible theory of how elected judges ought to negotiate 
legal indeterminacy, even if I personally do not agree with it.48  The latter is a 
species of official corruption and is unacceptable under any theory of 
judging.49  The threats posed to the rule of law and to the integrity of the 
courts from “political” judges are less profound, and different in kind, from the 
threats posed by “bought” judges.  And whereas judges have always been 
(partially) political throughout U.S. history, and have alwys been accused of 
such, it is doubtful that the threat of justice for sale hasever been so 
widespread. 
 
Elections, Balkinization, Nov. 4, 2010, at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/11/political-
polarization-and.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing evidence of “rise of 
more nationalized [congressional] elections” and hypothesizing that party polarization is main 
cause).  
 46. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:  Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 382 (2007). 
 47. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 36–37. 
 48. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2083–86 (analyzing 
relationship between judicial selection methods and jurisprudential methods under rubric of “role 
fidelity”). 
 49. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 5, at 290–93 (distinguishing judicial 
favoritism from judicial majoritarianism).  
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The public has started to appreciate this problem.  Retired Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has been unflagging in her efforts to expose and 
combat campaign-related improprieties.50  Newspaper editorials routinely 
highlight the ethical and due process concerns raised by judges’ hearing cases 
that involve contributors.51  The Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,52 in which the chief executive of a West Virginia 
coal company had spent millions on behalf of a state supreme court candidate 
who went on to cast the deciding vote in an appeal brought by the company, 
drew sustained national attention to the issue.  Just the other day, New York 
court officials announced a ban on elected judges’ hearing cases when any of 
the lawyers or parties has donated $2,500 or more to their campaigns in the 
preceding two years.53  There is real hope, in the short- and medium-term, that 
states will address this second criticism of elective judiciaries through recusal 
reforms and related measures.54 
There is far less hope that states will address the first criticism, for doing 
so requires nothing less than a return to the days of unexciti g and 
uncompetitive judicial races or, perhaps more realistically, abandonment of 
judicial elections altogether.  Indeed, to the extent that concerns over “judicial 
politics” have informed recent debates over how to select judges, they have cut 
in the opposite direction.  Supporters of elections have gotten tremendous 
mileage out of empirical findings and common-sense perceptions that 
appointed courts respond to various extralegal influences, such as partisan 
affiliations and reappointment incentives, and in this sense are “political” 
too.55  Given that all judges are to some extent legal policymakers who do not 
and could not resolve cases on the basis of legal sources alone, supporters of 
elections often assert, it follows that judges ought to be subject to electoral 
control like other high-level policymakers.56 
This does not follow.  Just because judging may involve significant 
decisional discretion, does not mean that judges ought to be subj ct to such 
intensive popular supervision.  As my article explains, there are many reasons, 
 
 50. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25. 
 51. See, e.g., Editorial, Justice Not for Sale, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 2009, at A26. 
 52. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 53. William Glaberson, State Is Cutting Judges’ Ties to Lawyers Who Are Donors, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 14, 2011, at A1. 
 54. See generally Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best 
Defense:  Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 Washburn L.J. 503 (2007) 
(reviewing state recusal rules and outlining possible reforms). 
 55. It is important to maintain perspective on thispoint.  For a compelling account of how 
“judicial politics” scholars have overstated the case that political preferences affect judicial 
decisionmaking, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 
50 B.C. L. Rev. 685 (2009). 
 56. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All 
the Others That Have Been Tried, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 267, 268 (2005) (arguing judicial elections 
are preferable because of “the opportunity they provide for a free people to choose those officials 
who exercise policy-making authority”); see also Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, In 
Defense of Judicial Elections 138–39 (2009) (emphasizing that even life-tenured “judges are 
political beings who make political decisions,” and accusing judicial election opponents of “not 
just assaulting a method for choosing judges but also . . . waging war on democratic processes 
and the rights of citizens to maintain control over government”). 
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including democratic reasons, why it may be healthy to insulate one branch of 
government from direct forms of public discipline.57  The observation that all 
judges are political does not entail that it would be futile or misguided to try to 
make them less political, or to make them political in different ways than other 
officials are.  Recusal reforms, U.S. Supreme Court guidance, and media 
scrutiny may help stave off additional abuses of the kind that took place in 
West Virginia.  Unless and until this subtler—and fundamentally 
antipopulist—point gains widespread traction, we can expect to see more of 
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